Rudd asserts that there are three integrated components to what he labels Xi’s “Marxist nationalism.” The first moves Chinese politics to “the Leninist left.” By this, Rudd means that Xi’s reforms have increased the leader’s power over the CPC, and restored both internal party discipline and its control over the state apparatus.

Mhm, it’s almost like they’re Marxist Leninist

The second component, according to Rudd, has pulled Chinese economics to “the Marxist left,” which he defines as reasserting the dominance of state planning over market forces, specifically by wielding the power of humongous state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Mhm, it’s almost like they’re actually socialist

The third component of Xi’s “Marxist nationalism” has shifted Chinese foreign policy to “the nationalist right.”

There’s a difference between the nationalism of chauvinism and self-sovereignty, and frankly, China’s nationalism isn’t about other-ing others.

In Rudd’s analysis, this has meant top-down campaigns that emphasize the centrality of Chinese civilization and the decline of the West.

Yes.

But what does all this mean for China and the world? Rudd makes some cautious economic predictions. He claims that talk of “peak China” has no real grounds, and rather reflects attempts by China-haters to imagine their desires into reality. A decade of slower Chinese growth, however, is definitely in the cards. This is in part due to issues such as demographic decline and falling productivity, as well as debt in key sectors, reduced global trade due to geopolitics, and a shortfall in private capital investment.

But Rudd suggests that China’s decade of slower growth is also likely due to the impacts of policies related to Xi’s “Marxist nationalism.” These include increased state planning, the use of SOEs as future vehicles of technology and innovation as well as increased suspicion of the private sector, and a push toward mercantilism.

Demographic decline? Isn’t that common with many other modern post-industrialized nations

Falling productivity and global trade? NO, that’s untrue

As for FDI, maybe that’s a problem (though China is a hegemony of its own, so it could be self-reliant on that matter)

And on the 2nd part, I’d prefer it as such.

After all, a growth of 5% from a $1 trillion GDP is better than a growth of 20% from $1 billion GDP

Compare this to Hung Ho-fung’s take, outlined in his book Clash of Empires (2022). Hung argues that if the CPC were able to sufficiently mitigate the overaccumulation-profitability crisis by boosting household incomes and consumption, it would lessen the need for China to export capital. In turn, this would reduce the need to fight the United States for spheres of influence. Hung contends that, though difficult, if a change like this were to take place on a large enough scale, it could help prevent an inter-capitalist rivalry from becoming open war.

On a side note, this seems good idea but then, here, China is implied as being capitalist and imperialist? (Bullshit again)

Mixed article, I tell ye hwat