According to Tarasenko’s assessment, the main drawbacks of this design include the increased fire hazard posed by the rubber-fabric screens, insufficient protection for the troops stationed on top, and the limited rotation of the combat compartment.
The basic design of the BTR-82A itself remains a separate issue.
“The BTR-80/82A is a vehicle with an outdated layout, and it is difficult to do anything noteworthy with it. This vehicle is not suited for the battlefield due to its weak armor,” Tarasenko noted.
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According to available data, installing this kit increases the APC’s weight by approximately 15%. The maximum speed on the highway is reduced to about 50 km/h, and on rough terrain—to 20 km/h.
Putting cheap lipstick on a turd, a now very very slow turd.
Note These vehicles are essentially unarmored for all intents and purposes and this isn’t a flaw drones newly revealed to the world, everybody who isn’t brainwashed by russian military propaganda has understood for decades that the armor on these is a complete joke… and yet russia keeps cranking these suicide boxes out. Ukraine on the otherhand saw how poorly these protected their troops in Afghanistan and started looking for better options that actually kept their soldiers alive.
Don’t take my word for it, listen to russians themselves shit on their own fantasy of an armored vehicle.
The advantages include high mobility, good maneuverability and maneuverability. But in almost everything else, the BTR-82A no longer looks like it fully meets the requirements of modern combat. Firstly, it’s not armored enough. It holds only light rifle fire and fragments, while it is vulnerable to RPGs, ATGM, 12.7 mm caliber bullets, enemy infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and especially kamikaze drones with a cumulative warhead. This is partially corrected locally by welding additional protection. But we need a factory solution.
Secondly, the BTR-82A does not have the most successful layout. The engine and transmission compartment with a diesel engine is located in the stern, and the amphibious combat compartment is located in the middle of the vehicle. The infantry is forced to disembark through the side hatches, which makes it vulnerable. This is one of the reasons why troops often prefer to ride on armor. In most modern armored personnel carriers, the engine is located in the front, which allows soldiers to leave the vehicle through the aft ramp.
Thirdly, there is insufficient mine protection. The bottom can only withstand a fragmentation grenade. Finally, fourthly, the surveillance and fire control systems, although they have been significantly improved compared to the basic BTR-80, still fall short of their Western counterparts.
https://militarnyi.com/en/blogs/btr-82a-vs-m113-why-the-russian-isn-t-a-competitor-to-the-american/
This time, the Russian military fired at an M113A3 armored personnel carrier (converted back to an APC Sidam-25 anti-aircraft gun) using a BTR-82A 30mm automatic cannon. This was done from a point-blank range of 100 meters.
Predictably, the BTR-82A missed most shots, with only two shells hitting the target. These two shells managed to cover the short distance and penetrate the side of the M113, which is to be expected given the close range.
This demonstration is somewhat embarrassing considering that the Russian BMP-3, touted as having no analogues, has similar aluminum sides with a thickness of 43 mm. It’s important to note that the M113 is an APC, whereas the BMP-3 is an IFV, marketed as a competitor to the Bradley!